The Future of Inter-American Relations by Thomas A. Shannon, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
George Washington University
Washington, DC
Assistant Secretary
George Washington University
Washington, DC
"The first big challenge we faced was in San Pedro Sula at the OAS General Assembly. There was real worry going into the OAS General Assembly that the issue of Cuba was going to crash the OAS General Assembly, the OAS, and multilateralism more broadly in the hemisphere, and that the United States and our partners were going to be faced with a question, which is what to do with a country like Cuba, which is not a democracy, which is not an open society, which is not committed to market based economies, in a community like the OAS, which is a community of democratic nations, it is a community of open societies, it is a community of countries committed to market based economies in one form or another. And the real worry was, how do you address a profound movement and desire within the larger inter-American community to lift the 1962 suspension on Cuba while not at the same time sacrificing the OAS’ broad commitment to democracy, its commitment to human rights, and to a structure and process of dialogue that we thought was going to be absolutely necessary if Cuba were to hope to incorporate itself back into the OAS at some future time.
This was not an easy issue to deal with. There were a variety of proposals that were circulating in the months leading up to the OAS General Assembly, and that continued to be worked with great interest and vigor during that Assembly. And ultimately as in all things multilateral, in order to shape a resolution that wins consensus, everybody has to give something. Not everybody is completely satisfied with what emerges from that process.
But I think what emerged from the process in San Pedro Sula was important for a couple of reasons. First, it allowed us to acknowledge what was almost unanimous around the room which was a desire to lift the 1962 suspension, to remove what many countries considered to be a Cold War relic. And instead, try to build a discussion around Cuba that was focused on the reality of the moment.
And in doing so we were able first of all to ensure that lifting of the suspension did not create an automatic return of Cuba to the OAS. Instead there would be a process that would be created. The process would be started by a request by the government of Cuba itself. But on top of that, that this process was going to require a dialogue with the pertinent organs and instruments of the OAS, and that dialogue was going to be guided by the practices, purposes, and principals of the OAS.
What that means, of course, is the broad commitment of the OAS to democracy, to human rights, to self determination, non-intervention, security and development. And all of the instruments in the OAS that address those specific themes and issues.
In the process we were going to be able to examine what this meant and actually have a vigorous discussion inside the OAS about what Cuba’s readmission means.
At the end of the day, I think we emerged from San Pedro Sula with an important advance, in terms of moving a dialogue about Cuba from 1962 to 2009. Secondly, to indicating very clearly that the OAS was going to move at a careful and deliberate pace on this. But finally, putting the burden of this issue back on Cuba itself. In other words, requiring Cuba to determine whether or not it wants to return to the OAS, and if so, asking it to request the beginning of this process." (full text)
This was not an easy issue to deal with. There were a variety of proposals that were circulating in the months leading up to the OAS General Assembly, and that continued to be worked with great interest and vigor during that Assembly. And ultimately as in all things multilateral, in order to shape a resolution that wins consensus, everybody has to give something. Not everybody is completely satisfied with what emerges from that process.
But I think what emerged from the process in San Pedro Sula was important for a couple of reasons. First, it allowed us to acknowledge what was almost unanimous around the room which was a desire to lift the 1962 suspension, to remove what many countries considered to be a Cold War relic. And instead, try to build a discussion around Cuba that was focused on the reality of the moment.
And in doing so we were able first of all to ensure that lifting of the suspension did not create an automatic return of Cuba to the OAS. Instead there would be a process that would be created. The process would be started by a request by the government of Cuba itself. But on top of that, that this process was going to require a dialogue with the pertinent organs and instruments of the OAS, and that dialogue was going to be guided by the practices, purposes, and principals of the OAS.
What that means, of course, is the broad commitment of the OAS to democracy, to human rights, to self determination, non-intervention, security and development. And all of the instruments in the OAS that address those specific themes and issues.
In the process we were going to be able to examine what this meant and actually have a vigorous discussion inside the OAS about what Cuba’s readmission means.
At the end of the day, I think we emerged from San Pedro Sula with an important advance, in terms of moving a dialogue about Cuba from 1962 to 2009. Secondly, to indicating very clearly that the OAS was going to move at a careful and deliberate pace on this. But finally, putting the burden of this issue back on Cuba itself. In other words, requiring Cuba to determine whether or not it wants to return to the OAS, and if so, asking it to request the beginning of this process." (full text)
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